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EXPLORING LAWFUL HACKING AS A 
POSSIBLE ANSWER TO THE 
“GOING DARK” DEBATE
Carlos Liguori*
The debate on government access to encrypted data, popularly known 
as the “going dark” debate, has intensified over the years. On the one 
hand, law enforcement authorities have been pushing for mandatory 
exceptional access mechanisms on encryption systems in order to 
enable criminal investigations of both data in transit and at rest. On 
the other hand, both technical and industry experts argue that this 
solution compromises the security of encrypted systems and, thus, the 
privacy of their users. Some claim that other means of investigation 
could provide the information authorities seek without weakening 
encryption, with lawful hacking being one of the most suggested 
alternatives. “Lawful hacking,” also known as “government hacking,” 
consists in the deployment, by investigative authorities, of tools that 
allow for the intrusion into computer systems, enabling access to its 
contents. Although this form of investigation seems to be essential in 
an increasingly connected society, it is important to understand 
security and privacy risks of different lawful hacking regulatory 
approaches. Considering that some countries are already enacting 
legal frameworks related to it, I aim to highlight the issues that should 
be properly addressed in order to position lawful hacking as one of the 
viable answers to the “going dark” debate.
* Resident Fellow of the Information Society Project at Yale Law School. Ph.D can-
didate at the University of São Paulo, Faculty of Law. I would like to thank the Yale ISP 
community, especially Professor Jack Balkin, Nikolas Guggenberger, Maren Woebbeking, 
Rafael Nunes, Przemyslaw Palka, Chinmayi Arun, Michael Karanicolas, Jisu Kim, Sari Maz-
zurco and all the other participants in the ISP Writer’s Workshop; the participants of the 2019 
Student Symposium on Cybersecurity Policy at Tufts University, especially Professors Susan 
Landau, Steven Bellovin and David O’Brien; and the CEPI-FGV researchers Guilherme Ken-
zo dos Santos, João Pedro Favaretto Salvador and Tatiane Guimarães for their invaluable help
in the drafting of this note. The views in this note are entirely my own.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the debate on government access to encrypted data in 
the context of criminal investigations, popularly known as the “going dark”
debate, has certainly intensified. On the one hand, law enforcement agencies 
around the world are pressing for legal rules that restrict the use of strong 
encryption systems, arguing that its widespread adoption prevents access to 
data that may be essential to aid criminal investigations. This pressure inten-
sified after popular online services and operating systems began encrypting 
user data by default—which means that even criminals with no technical 
knowledge can benefit from the technology and leave law enforcement au-
thorities “in the dark.” The solution, they argue, resides in mandatory im-
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plementation of exceptional access mechanisms in those encrypted systems, 
which would enable access to plaintext by authorities.
1
On the other hand, industry and technical experts contend that the inser-
tion of these mechanisms will weaken the systems in their totality, compro-
mising the security—and, consequently, the privacy—of all their users. In 
addition, experts point to various issues that could arise from this kind of 
approach. These issues include (but are not limited to): (i) the limiting of 
civil liberties and rights that are enabled by the use of strong encryption; (ii) 
jurisdictional problems from imposing restrictions to services offered inter-
nationally; and (iii) the hampering of technological development, as security 
is increasingly seen as a product differentiator.
2
Often, alternative means of investigation are suggested in order to steer 
authorities away from restricting encryption. One of the most suggested al-
ternatives is to focus on “lawful” or “government hacking.” This consists of 
law enforcement authorities deploying hacking tools, such as exploitation of 
system vulnerabilities or development of malware, in order to access either 
encrypted data at rest (data that is stored in a device) or in transit (data that 
is flowing from one device to another through a network). Though specific 
information is scarce, government hacking has been deployed in practice 
since at least the 1990s,
3
but its regulation (or lack thereof) has been a sub-
ject of debate only recently.
While this form of investigation seems to be essential in an increasingly 
connected society, it is important to understand possible security and priva-
cy risks of different government hacking regulatory approaches.
Within the context of the encryption debate, several countries are al-
ready discussing and implementing laws related to lawful hacking. Some of 
them sought to regulate the activity in addition to the legal regulation of 




while others have chosen not 
1. In the public debate, “exceptional access mechanisms” on encrypted systems are 
often referred to as “backdoors.” “Backdoor [is] a general term describing a mechanism or 
access point in a communications device or network that enables “the creator of software or 
hardware [to] access data without the permission or knowledge of the user,” Stephanie K. 
Pell, You Can’t Always Get What You Want: How Will Law Enforcement Get What It Needs in 
a Post-CALEA, Cybersecurity-Centric Encryption Era?, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 599, 609 
(2016).
2. See generally Harold Abelson et al., Keys Under Doormats: Mandating Insecurity 
by Requiring Government Access to All Data and Communications, 1 J. CYBERSECURITY 69 
(2015).
3. For an illustrative study on high profile cases of lawful hacking in the United 
States, see SAYAKO QUINLAN & ANDI WILSON, NEW AMERICA OPEN KNOWLEDGE 
INSTITUTE, A BRIEF HISTORY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT HACKING IN THE UNITED STATES
(2016).
4. See generally Bhairav Acharya et al., NEW AMERICA OPEN KNOWLEDGE 
INSTITUTE, DECIPHERING THE EUROPEAN ENCRYPTION DEBATE: FRANCE (2017).
5. In Australia, government access to encrypted data is regulated by the Telecommu-
nications (Interception and Access) Act of 1997, the Surveillance Devices Act of 2004, and 
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to regulate encryption. The latter group instead concentrates its efforts on 
alternative means of investigation, especially lawful hacking, while choos-





My general perception is that while policymakers are moving forward 
with legislation related to both government access to encrypted data and 
lawful hacking, some stakeholders in the public debate seem almost entirely 
concentrated on denouncing the security and privacy risks of limiting en-
cryption. This group sometimes suggests alternative solutions, but they are 
not usually explored in depth. I argue that lawful hacking should take the 
center stage of the “going dark” debate for two reasons: first, it seems to be 
a better (although imperfect) alternative solution to exceptional access; sec-
ond, law enforcement agencies already deploy hacking tools for investiga-
tive purposes, yet lawmakers are not properly addressing the plethora of is-
sues that come with it.
With this scenario in mind, Part I of this Note briefly describes the 
background of the “going dark” debate by pointing out the main questions 
behind it and responses to it. This part will also explore frequently suggest-
ed alternatives to mandatory access, with special emphasis on lawful hack-
ing.
Part II aims to identify the main issues that should be considered in the 
elaboration of a legal framework for lawful hacking by law enforcement.
This includes its concept and scope, costs and development, accountability, 
and jurisdictional problems.
Finally, Part III aims to understand how (and if) those issues are being 
addressed in recently enacted lawful hacking regulations.
I. THE CONTEMPORARY “GOING DARK” DEBATE
The contemporary debate on encryption regulation and government ac-
cess to encrypted data has its roots in the late 1990s, shortly after the launch 
of commercial Internet. Back then, its use was still reasonably restricted to 
the technical and academic communities, as well as to those able to afford 
personal computers and an Internet connection. The operating mechanism of 
the Internet is the same today as it was then: a set of decentralized and 
transnational networks that connect devices to each other, enabling ex-
the Crimes Act of 1914. All those Laws were recently amended by the 2018 Telecommunica-
tions and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access), which reasonably expanded 
the government’s lawful investigatory powers. See infra section III.C.
6. See generally BHAIRAV ACHARYA ET AL., NEW AMERICA OPEN KNOWLEDGE 
INSTITUTE, DECIPHERING THE EUROPEAN ENCRYPTION DEBATE: GERMANY (2017).
7. See Janene Pieters, Dutch Parliament Approves Bill to Hack Criminal Suspects, NL
TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016), https://nltimes.nl/2016/12/21/dutch-parliament-approves-bill-hack-
criminal-suspects.
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changes of information between them.
8
This design makes it simultaneously 
hard to regulate and structurally insecure.
Cryptographic systems are paramount to overcoming the insecurity of 
information exchange. They are an integral part of the proper functioning of 
the Internet since they allow for safe traffic of data between parties and also 
authenticate the identity of those involved in these operations. Without such 
systems, banking transactions, communication, and online shopping would 
be far more susceptible to intrusion and fraud, and therefore less attractive 
to users. In addition, encryption can also be deployed to protect data stored 
in computers.
In the mid-90s, U.S. law enforcement and national security agencies
9
began to worry about the prospect of wide adoption of encryption technolo-
gies for online communication. They argued that encryption would hinder 
criminal investigations, particularly law enforcement activity involving the 
interception of data in transit and access to data at rest in encrypted disks. 
At the time, a solution provided by the U.S. government was the implemen-
tation of a mechanism, developed and provided by the authorities, that 
would encrypt the data and, at the same time, provide the authorities with 
the decryption keys through an escrow system. This mechanism was called 
the Clipper Chip—a computer chip that was intended to be acquired by 
manufacturers and installed on machines marketed in the United States.
10
The initiative was widely criticized, especially by technical and industry 
experts.
11
The criticism focused on the fact that cryptographic systems en-
dowed with this type of exceptional access given to third parties would be 
inherently unsafe in their entirety. It would suffice to foreclose the idea, 
they argued, that the keys accessible to government agents would fall into 
the wrong hands and then anyone—including those with less noble inten-
tions than law enforcement—could access private users’ data.
12
In 1994, then-AT&T Bell Laboratories cryptographer Matt Blaze found 
a vulnerability in the Clipper Chip system that allowed for the encryption of 
data using the system’s algorithm (Skipjack) without delivering the key in 
escrow to the government authority, thus rendering the entire system useless 
8. P. W. SINGER & ALLAN FRIEDMAN, CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERWAR: WHAT 
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 21-25 (Oxford University. Press 2014).
9. This article aims to focus exclusively on the law enforcement side of the “going 
dark” debate. For a more in depth look at the national security side and its ramifications, see 
WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE 77-108 (2007); NAT’L ACADS.
SCIS., ENGINEERING, & MED., DECRYPTING THE ENCRYPTION DEBATE: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
DECISION MAKERS 36-48 (2018).
10. See Parker Higgins, On the Clipper Chip’s Birthday, Looking Back on Decades of 
Key Escrow Failures, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2015/04/clipper-chips-birthday-looking-back-22-years-key-escrow-failures.
11. See Hal Abelson et al., The Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third-
Party Encryption (1997), https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8GM8F2W.
12. See Abelson et al., supra note 2, at 1.
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for its main objectives. This, along with the failure of the Chip to be adopted 
by the market, resulted in the initiative being entirely dropped by the U.S. 
government in 1996.
13
There was a shift toward the liberalization of encryption both in the 
United States and abroad in the early 2000s.
14
Anticlimactically, strong en-
cryption was not immediately adopted by the majority of Internet users and 
services, who in those early years seemed to be more concerned with ease of 
use and cost than data security.
15
Between the Clipper Chip initiative and the more recent “going dark”
debate, more than a decade passed without encryption being in the spotlight 
as an issue to law enforcement. In the meantime, the Internet became indis-
pensable to everyone. No longer exclusive to technicians, academics and the 
wealthiest, the Internet became the main form of communication in society 
across economic, social, and cultural spheres. Increased use of the network 
meant greater flow of data and information. Consequently, there was greater 
reliance on access to this information by criminal investigators. It is in this 
scenario that the contemporary debate on regulation of cryptography arises.
A. Framing the Debate: Encryption “By Default” and 
Mandatory Exceptional Access
In 2013, Edward Snowden released documents that exposed a complex 
global surveillance scheme conducted by the U.S. government. The former 
CIA employee and NSA contractor provided thousands of official docu-
ments supporting the allegations.
16
The revelations showed surveillance 
programs aimed at U.S. and non-U.S. citizens, including governmental au-
thorities from various countries (e.g., former Brazilian President Dilma 
Rousseff). To enable this scheme, the National Security Agency (“NSA”)
developed and purchased sophisticated mechanisms for exploiting system 
vulnerabilities and for data collection. The Agency also accessed and moni-
tored user data pertaining to large companies such as Google, Microsoft, 
Facebook, and Apple.
13. See Matt Blaze, Protocol Failure in the Escrowed Encryption Standard, 2 ACM
CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 59 (1994).
14. Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization. 23 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 440 (2012).
15. SUSAN LANDAU, SURVEILLANCE OR SECURITY? THE RISKS POSED BY NEW 
WIRETAPPING TECHNOLOGY 47 (2011) (“The public, while in principle wanting private 
communications, in practice appears willing to make it private only if the system is simple to 
use, does not affect the communications by slowing them down or degrading quality, and 
cheap (as in little or no cost to the user).”).
16. See generally Ewen Macaskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded, What the 
Revelations Mean for You, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-decoded.
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The revelations struck the international community, and the issues of 
privacy and online data protection took the spotlight again. Although the 
NSA held the majority of the responsibility, much of the negative repercus-
sions also fell on technology companies. Consumers began to distrust the 
quality and security of their products and services. What followed was the 
so-called “Snowden effect,” in which technology companies addressed pri-
vacy and security concerns related to their services in order to regain con-
sumer trust.
17
In this context, several companies have implemented strong, standard-
ized cryptographic systems in their services . This means that the use of en-
cryption in conjunction with the normal functionality of the application (for 
example, a messaging app) does not require any type of user opt-in, activa-
tion, manual installation, nor any kind of in-depth technical knowledge of 
encryption techniques. Many popular services have adopted this “encryption 
by default” approach, including instant messaging applications (WhatsApp, 
iMessage, and Signal use end-to-end encryption for communications data
18
)
and operating systems (such as Apple’s iOS, for stored data
19
).
If in the past strong encryption was used only by the few with technical 
knowledge or those who were required to encrypt by virtue of their profes-
sions (such as some lawyers), it is now accessible to even the most casual 
technology user. Although this has meant more security for general users, 
the protection and ease of use also applies to non-tech-savvy criminals.
The 2015 San Bernardino terrorist attack was a paradigmatic event for 
the debate on legal regulation of cryptography and government access to 
encrypted data. In the attack, sixteen people were killed, including the as-
sailants. During the course of its investigation, the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation (“FBI”) was unable to access the iPhone 5C data of one of the per-
petrators.
20
The phone was updated to Apple’s iOS 9 operating system, which 
meant that access was password protected and its content was encrypted 
given that iPhone encryption is provided by default. Furthermore, the cell 
17. See, e. g., Laura Hautala, The Snowden Effect: Privacy is Good for Business, CNET
(June 3, 2016), https://www.cnet.com/news/the-snowden-effect-privacy-is-good-for-business-
nsa-data-collection.
18. See Security and Privacy: End-to-End Encryption, WHATSAPP,
https://faq.whatsapp.com/en/general/28030015 (last visited Mar. 22, 2020); Technical Infor-
mation, SIGNAL, https://signal.org/docs/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2020).
19. See Cyrus Farivar, Apple Expands Data Encryption Under iOS 8, Making Hando-
ver to Cops Moot, ARS TECHNICA. (Sept. 18, 2014), www.arstechnica.com/apple/2014/09/
apple-expands-data-encryption-under-ios-8-making-handover-to-cops-moot.
20. It is interesting to note that if the perpetrator’s iPhone was a newer model (iPhone 
5S onwards), unlocking the contents could be far easier if fingerprint or facial recognition was
activated. The iPhone 5C was the last model that did not support these kinds of authentication.
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phone also had a second layer of protection against brute force attacks:
21
Af-
ter ten wrong attempts in the password field, all of the content in the device 
would be erased.
One outcome of the San Bernardino case was that the FBI asked Apple 
to develop an operating system that enabled law enforcement to access us-
ers’ data. Apple resisted the request, claiming that the insertion of the mech-
anism would weaken the security of its handsets and compromise the priva-
cy of its users.
Faced with the company’s refusal, the FBI took Apple to court but then 
withdrew the complaint in March 2016 after obtaining the requested data 
with the help of an undisclosed third party. Still, law enforcement authori-
ties have come to denounce the difficulties of strong encryption in the con-
text of criminal investigations, rekindling a fervent international debate over 
the limits of government access to encrypted data. This is what became 
known as the “going dark” debate, a term coined by the FBI’s former Gen-
eral Counsel Valerie Caproni in 2011,
22
popularized by former FBI Director 
James Comey in 2014
23
and recently reinforced by current FBI Director 
Christopher Wray
24
and U.S. Attorney General William Barr.
25
Far from limiting itself to the United States, the “going dark” debate 
spread worldwide, and a number of governments have either expressed the 
need for or passed legislation regarding government access to encrypted da-
ta.
26
Mandatory exceptional access is often brought up by government au-
21. “Brute force attacks” to encrypted systems refer to trying every kind of possible 
combination of passwords or pin in the hopes of finding the right one.
22. Valerie Caproni, Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee 
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 17, 2011), 
https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/going-dark-lawful-electronic-surveillance-in-
the-face-of-new-technologies.
23. James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Going Dark: Are Technology, 
Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course?, Brookings Institution (Oct. 16, 2014), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-
a-collision-course.
24. See Devlin Barrett, FBI Repeatedly Overstated Encryption Threat Figures to Con-
gress, Public, WASH. POST (May 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/fbi-repeatedly-overstated-encryption-threat-figures-to-congress-public/2018/05/22/
5b68ae90-5dce-11e8-a4a4-c070ef53f315_story.html.
25. William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., Keynote Address at the International Conference on 
Cyber Security, New York (July 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-
general-william-p-barr-delivers-keynote-address-international-conference-cyber.
26. According to research conducted by the Centro de Ensino e Pesquisa em Inovação 
at Fundação Getulio Vargas, between 2010 and 2017, at least twenty-four countries have ei-
ther officially been discussing or actively implementing legislation that aims to address the 
issues at stake in the “going dark” debate. Different countries proposed different regulatory 
approaches to encryption: some are actively stimulating the adoption of strong encryption 
(Netherlands); some aim to restrict it either by prohibiting its deployment (Iran) or by limiting 
the size of cryptographic keys (India); other countries require parties (users, vendors, etc.) to 
provide assistance to law enforcement in accessing encrypted data (Ireland, Mexico). Most of 
these legal frameworks were enacted fairly recently, and the full extent of their practical ap-
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While not explicitly requiring companies to alter their systems in 
order to provide law enforcement access to data, recently enacted laws came 
under fire for their restrictive approach towards encryption.
29
B. Suggesting Alternatives: Enabling Criminal Investigations 
Without Compromising Encryption
As law enforcement and other government actors pushed for a regulato-
ry approach that could restrict the use of encryption, a large number of re-
searchers, technical and industry experts, non-profit organizations 
(“NPOs”), and other actors weighed in against it.
30
They point out that the 
insertion of these mechanisms will necessarily weaken the systems as a 
whole, compromising the security of all users—including those not under 
investigation and those that live outside the jurisdiction in which the policy 
would be implemented.
As a consequence, they argue, mandatory weakening of encryption can 
be extremely harmful to the exercise of fundamental rights and civil liber-
plicability and effectiveness remain to be understood when applied in specific cases. For a 
comprehensive analysis and mapping of the debate, see Cryptomap, CENTRO DE ENSINO E
PESQUISA EM INOVAÇÃO, FGV DIREITO SP (2018), http://www.fgv.br/direitosp/cryptomap.
27. See Julia Carrie Wong, US, UK and Australia Urge Facebook to Create Backdoor 
Access to Encrypted Messages, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2019/oct/03/facebook-surveillance-us-uk-australia-backdoor-encryption.
28. See Sébastian Seibt, French Candidate Macron Targets Encryption in Fight 
Against Terrorism, FRANCE 24 (Apr. 12, 2017). https://www.france24.com/en/20170412-
candidate-macron-encryption-fight-terror-whatsapp-telegram.
29. See, e. g., Alex Hern, UK Government Can Force Encryption Removal, but Fears 
Losing, Experts Say, GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2017/mar/29/uk-government-encryption-whatsapp-investigatory-powers-act (implications of 
the United Kingdom’s Investigatory Powers Act of 2016); Lily Newman, Australia’s
Encryption-Busting Law Could Impact Global Privacy, WIRED (Dec. 7, 2018), 
https://www.wired.com/story/australia-encryption-law-global-impact (implications of Austral-
ia’s Assistance and Access Act of 2018).
30. See, e.g., DANIEL CASTRO & ALAN MCQUINN. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION FOUNDATION, UNLOCKING ENCRYPTION: INFORMATION SECURITY AND THE
RULE OF LAW (2016); LEX GILL, TAMIR ISRAEL & CHRISTOPHER PARSONS, CITIZEN LAB 
AND THE SAMUELSON-GLUSHKO CANADIAN INTERNET POLICY & PUBLIC INTEREST CLINIC,
SHINING A LIGHT ON THE ENCRYPTION DEBATE: A CANADIAN FIELD GUIDE (2018); 
BERKMAN KLEIN CTR., DON’T PANIC: MAKING PROGRESS ON THE “GOING DARK DEBATE”
(2016); EASTWEST INST., ENCRYPTION POLICY IN DEMOCRATIC REGIMES: FINDING 
CONVERGENT PATHS AND BALANCED SOLUTIONS (2018); NAT’L ACADS. SCIS.,
ENGINEERING, & MED., supra note 9; Abelson et al., supra note 11; Amnesty Int’l, Encryp-
tion: A Matter of Human Rights, AI INDEX POL 40/3682/2016 (March 2016); Charles Duan et 
al., Policy Approaches to the Encryption Debate, R STREET POL’Y STUDY 133 (2018); Wolf-
gang Schulz & Joris van Hoboken, Human Rights and Encryption (UNESCO Series on Inter-
net Freedom 2016); Stefan Soesanto. No Middle Ground: Moving on From the Crypto Wars,
EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. ECFR/263 (2018).’
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ties in the digital sphere, especially the right to privacy.
31
These rights are 
best protected by ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of information 
shared via the Internet and stored in computer devices. The right to freedom 
of expression
32
in particular is promoted by enabling communication be-
tween parties without fear of surveillance. Reinforcing this position, the Of-
fice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(“OHCHR”) has developed a number of documents highlighting not only 
the importance of cryptography in this scenario but also the need for States 
to ensure that the development of the mechanism is promoted and not lim-
ited in its use.
33
To help solve the “going dark” problem, some scholars claim that tech-
nological development and the widespread use of data gathering and data 
generating technologies could represent a plethora of alternatives to law en-
forcement without compromising encrypted systems. The most prevalent 
examples of those alternatives are: (i) access to communications metadata; 
(ii) access to non-encrypted data stored in cloud services; (iii) metadata of 
Internet of Things (“IoT”) devices; and, often cited as a last resort solution, 
(iv) government hacking. Some scholars suggest that these alternative 
sources of information and investigation have the potential to enhance law 
enforcement capabilities so much that we could be living in a “golden age 
of surveillance.”
34
(i) Communications metadata refers to information about communica-
tions data, separate from the communication content itself. This category of 
information may include: device location data, IP address of the sender and 
receiver of the communications, telephone calling records, and more. This 
kind of data is often not encrypted—it has to be so in order for telecommu-
nications systems to function
35
—and may provide crucial information for 
law enforcement agencies without the need to access encrypted data.
36
31. See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 30, at 10.
32. See Schulz & van Hoboken, supra note 30, at 51.
33. More specifically, the OHCHR has produced two reports and an international pub-
lic consultation on the regulation of cryptography. See David Kaye, Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Rep. of the 
Human Rights Council on Its Thirty-Second Session, Promotion and Protection of All Human 
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Devel-
opment, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/38 (May 11, 2016); Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Rep. of the 
Human Rights Council on Its Twenty-Third Session, Promotion and Protection of All Human 
Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Devel-
opment, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013).
34. See Swire & Ahmad, supra note 14, at 464.
35. See Berkman Klein Ctr., supra note 30, at 3.
36. In Brazil, for example, the use of metadata by law enforcement authorities was par-
amount in the investigation of two of the most high-profile crimes in recent Brazilian history: 
the 2011 murder of Judge Patricia Acioli and the 2018 murder of City Counselor Marielle 
Franco and driver Anderson Gomes. Cellphone location data and browser history—along with 
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(ii) Cloud storage is a kind of online service that has increased in popu-
larity over the past years. For the most part, they consist of premium or 
freemium
37
services that allow users to store files in remote servers. Those 
servers, and thus the user’s files, can be accessed through any device with 
an Internet connection.
More often than not, these services are offered by companies that de-
velop operating systems for computational devices: Apple offers iCloud; 
Google offers Google Drive; Microsoft offers OneDrive. It is pretty com-
mon and convenient for users to enable these services when setting their de-
vices. As a consequence, all files generated, received, or sent to devices are 
replicated and stored in the cloud. Most cloud services store data in a way 
that allows for the service provider to access it,
38
which means there should 
be no technical impediment for law enforcement to lawfully require access 
to a client’s data.
The security of cloud services is extremely relevant and widely debated 
in contemporary data protection studies,
39
and encrypted cloud services 
seem to be on the rise.
40
However, it seems that non-encrypted cloud ser-
vices could be an efficient short-term alternative for criminal investigations 
that does not require compromising cryptographic systems as a whole.
(iii) Another alternative source of information that could aid law en-
forcement immensely is the data and metadata provided by Internet of 
Things (“IoT”) devices.41 The growing popularity of IoT devices—
hundreds of other gigabytes of metadata—were used to find the culprits in both cases. See 
Cecília Ritto, Inquérito conclui que policiais mataram juíza para evitar pedido de prisão. 
VEJA (Sept. 12, 2011), https://veja.abril.com.br/brasil/inquerito-conclui-que-policiais-
mataram-juiza-para-evitar-pedido-de-prisao/; Márcio Padrão, Caso Marielle: como celulares 
levaram a acusados e por que isso é um avanço. UOL (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://noticias.uol.com.br/tecnologia/noticias/redacao/2019/03/13/como-os-celulares-
ajudaram-a-achar-o-assassino-de-marielle-franco.htm.
37. Normally, those services offer free storage up to a limited size. After the limit is 
reached, the user can opt to subscribe to the service in order to acquire more storage space. 
Google Drive, for example, offers 15GB of storage to users for free, and up to 2TB for paid 
plans. See: GOOGLE ONE, https://one.google.com/about (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
38. See NAT’L ACADS. SCIS., ENGINEERING, & MED., supra note 9, at 5, 55. It is im-
portant to note that the vast majority of cloud services do use encryption to secure the com-
munication layer between the user and the server where the files are stored.
39. See, e. g., Samuel Lustgarten, Emerging Ethical Threats to Client Privacy in Cloud 
Communication and Data Storage, 46. PROF’L PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 154 (2015) (for eth-
ics and data protection); Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, 
and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359 
(2010); Charles Wharton & K. I. Lin, Comparative Legislation, Corporate Policy, and Citizen 
Concerns: Legal Solutions for Privacy Protection in Cloud Computing, 49 INT’L CARNAHAN 
CONF. ON SECURITY TECH. 19 (2015) (for comparative regulation)’.
40. See Steve O’Hear, Cloud Storage Startup Tresorit Raises $3M to Put Security Spot-
light on Dropbox, Box and Others, TECHCRUNCH (May 1, 2014), 
https://techcrunch.com/2014/05/01/tresorit (discussing the European startup Tresorit).
41. See Berkman Klein Ctr., supra note 30.
328 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 26:317
networked sensors and devices, such as Smart TVs and Internet-connected 
GPS—could be a rich source of information for authorities during investiga-
tions. Data and metadata from IoT devices tend not to be encrypted and, 
moreover, those devices often struggle with security issues related to wire-
less connectivity, outdated software, and hard-to-patch vulnerabilities. De-
spite those alarming issues in regard to user privacy and data protection, 
they could nonetheless help authorities access relevant information.
(iv) Finally, the most discussed
42
alternative to overcoming the “going 
dark” debate is lawful hacking (or government hacking). As previously 
mentioned in regard to the Apple v. FBI case, the FBI withdrew the com-
plaint because it was able to access the encrypted data through a tool pur-
chased from a private company specialized in hacking software.
43
There 
was, in this case, no mandatory change in Apple’s encryption system—the 
U.S. government used that third-party tool to successfully hack the encrypt-
ed device.
Lawful hacking seems to be a viable alternative to the restriction of en-
cryption or the mandatory exceptional access: Instead of requesting tech-
nology companies to sabotage their own security systems and knowingly 
compromise the security and privacy of their users, this alternative focus on 
observing and exploiting preexisting (and often unintended) security holes. 
As stated by professors Bellovin, Blaze, Clark and Landau:
Put simply, the choice is between formalizing (and thereby con-
straining) the ability of law enforcement to occasionally use exist-
ing security vulnerabilities—something the FBI and other law en-
forcement agencies already do when necessary without much 
public or legal scrutiny—or living with those vulnerabilities and in-
tentionally and systematically creating a set of predictable new vul-
42. See, e.g., EASTWEST INST. supra note 30; JAMES A. LEWIS ET AL., CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDS., THE EFFECT OF ENCRYPTION ON LAWFUL ACCESS TO 
COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA (2017); Bert-Jaap Koops & Eleni Kosta, Looking for Some 
Light Through the Lens of “Cryptowar” History: Policy Options for Law Enforcement Au-
thorities Against “Going Dark,” 38 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 890 (2018); Castro & 
McQuinn, supra note 30; Susan Hennessey, Lawful Hacking and the Case for a Strategic Ap-
proach to “Going Dark,” in BROOKINGS BIG IDEAS FOR AMERICA 241, 242 (2016); Alan Ro-
zenshtein. Wicked Crypto, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 118, 119 (2019); ‘Hoaithi Y. Nguyen, Law-
ful Hacking: Toward a Middle-Ground Solution to the Going Dark Problem (Mar. 2017) 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey) (on file with the Naval Post-
graduate School Monterey library system); see also Sven Herpig, Government Hacking: 
Global Challenges, STIFTUNG NEUE VERANTWORTUNG (Jan. 2018), https://www.stiftung-
nv.de/sites/default/files/government_hacking_akt.feb_.pdf; Jonathan Mayer, Government 
Hacking, 127 YALE L.J. 570, 590 (2018); Amie Stepanovich, A Human Rights Response to 
Government Hacking (Sept. 2016), https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2016/09/
GovernmentHackingDoc.pdf.
43. See Alina Selyukh, The FBI Has Successfully Unlocked the iPhone Without Apple’s
Help, NPR (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/28/
472192080/the-fbi-has-successfully-unlocked-the-iphone-without-apples-help.
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nerabilities that despite best efforts will be exploitable by every-
one.
44
Even though it is the most suggested alternative to restricting encryp-
tion, a proper legal regulation of lawful hacking comes with a complex set 
of issues that have to be addressed in order to guarantee it is being deployed 
in accordance with due process and the fundamental rights of investigated 
parties. These problems will be addressed in the next section.
II. LAWFUL HACKING AS AN INVESTIGATIVE TOOL:
REGULATORY CHALLENGES
In a world that is increasingly connected, online, and dependent on data, 
it makes sense that law enforcement and investigation authorities seek to 
adapt their activities to this new reality. Digital evidence and cybernetic in-
vestigation are fundamental pillars in this scenario. In this sense, lawful 
hacking seems to be essential in cybercrime cases of great complexity, es-
pecially those related to crimes in the darknet
45
(e.g., Operation Onymous, a 
cooperation between investigative authorities in different countries to over-
throw and apprehend responsible parties for illicit markets in the deep web, 
such as Silk Road 2.0 and Black Market).
46
In comparison to the mandatory exceptional access approach, lawful 
hacking presents a better way forward. As stated by Susan Hennessey:
Instead of creating additional vulnerabilities to an already-fragile 
security ecosystem in the form of exceptional access, these com-
mentators argued that law enforcement should exploit existing vul-
nerabilities in software and hardware. In theory, the position offers 
a workable middle ground by which law enforcement is able to ac-
44. Steven M. Bellovin et al., Lawful Hacking: Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wire-
tapping on the Internet, 12 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 5 (2014).
45. For more information on the usefulness of hacking tools to operations on the dark-
net/deep web, see Orin S. Kerr & Sean D. Murphy. Government Hacking to Light the Dark 
Web: What Risks to International Relations and International Law. 58 STAN. L. REV. 70
(2017).
46. Law enforcement and judicial agencies around the globe undertook a joint action, 
coordinated by Europol’s EC3, the FBI, ICE, HIS and Eurojust, against dark markets running 
as hidden services on the Tor network. The action aimed to stop the sale, distribution and 
promotion of illegal and harmful items, which were sold on online dark marketplaces. Opera-
tion Onymous, EUROPOL, https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/europol-in-
action/operations/operation-onymous (last visited Mar. 15, 2020). Vulnerabilities in the Tor 
network (which enables access to much of the deep web content) were used throughout the 
operation to identify actors and systems used by these websites. See generally QUINLAN &
WILSON, supra note 3.
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cess a sufficient amount of communications and companies are un-
impeded in designing secure systems.
47
However, it is extremely important to highlight the risks posed by law-
ful hacking in the absence of clear legal and procedural frameworks for its 
deployment. On the legal side, depending on what is being hacked, the po-
tential for privacy violations can be higher than traditional means of access 
to information, such as phone wiretapping. On the technical side, there is 
the issue of informational security weakening: A non-disclosed vulnerability 
might be discovered by a malicious party and used for its advantage, com-
promising systems and their users.
There is also the issue of properly disclosing vulnerabilities after their 
discovery and exploitation. On the one hand, lawful hacking tools can be 
extremely expensive and hard to find; on the other, the non-disclosure of 
vulnerabilities used in concluded investigations can directly affect the secu-
rity and privacy of uninvestigated users of the exploited system and also af-
fect the business model of service providers. Lastly, there is also the fact 
that lawful hacking can easily transcend national borders and directly affect 
citizens of other countries.
With that in mind, the next section will further explore the main issues 
that must be tackled in establishing a legal framework for lawful hacking: 
(i) legal concept/scope; (ii) prerequisites for deployment; (iii) development 
and sharing of hacking tools; (iv) accountability and disclosure of vulnera-
bilities; and (v) jurisdictional issues.
A. Conceptualizing Lawful Hacking for Legal Purposes
The first issue in regulating lawful hacking is, naturally, its legal defini-
tion. Defining the term and choosing a single expression to reference it 
seems to be something that is taken for granted in legal scholarship. In re-
ports, papers, and policy briefs it is possible to find “lawful hacking,” “gov-
ernment hacking,” “law enforcement hacking,” and “network investigative 
techniques” being used to refer to the same general idea of authorities using 
hacking tools to access data.
48
47. Hennessey, supra note 40.
48. For papers using “government hacking,” see, e.g., Herpig, supra note 42; Mayer, 
supra note 42, at 590; Stepanovich, supra note 42. “Law enforcement hacking” is used in
QUINLAN & WILSON, supra note 2; Mirja Gutheil et al., Legal Frameworks for Hacking by 
Law Enforcement: Identification, Evaluation and Comparison of Practices, LIBE
COMMITTEE EURO. PARLIAMENT (2017). For “network investigative techniques,” see, e.g.,
Susan Hennessey & Nicholas Weaver, A Judicial Framework for Evaluating Network Investi-
gative Techniques, LAWFARE (July 28, 2016) https://www.lawfareblog.com/judicial-
framework-evaluating-network-investigative-techniques. For this Author’s preferred term, 
“lawful hacking,” see generally Bellovin et al., supra note 44.
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“Lawful hacking” seems to be the most well-suited term, since it is 
broad with regard to the technical tools and at the same time specific regard-
ing the nature of the activity—it must be expressly permitted by law. “Gov-
ernment” and “law enforcement” hacking do not imply lawfulness nor in-
clude the possibility of third parties being involved with the activity (I will 
further explore this issue in Part II). “Network investigative techniques,” in 
its turn, limits the scope of activity to exploitation of networks—meaning 
remote access to data—failing to encompass access to seized devices, such 
as with the San Bernardino iPhone case.
In drafting a legal framework for lawful hacking, one challenge is to 
conceptualize it without specifically stating the technologies that are used in 
this approach. Otherwise, technological development will render the frame-
work outdated in no time. Broadly, “hacking” can be defined as:
the manipulation of software, data, a computer system, network, or 
other electronic device without the permission of the person or or-
ganization responsible for that software application, data, computer 
system, network, or electronic device, and/or without the permis-
sion or knowledge of users of that or other software, data, comput-
ers, networks, or devices ultimately affected by the manipulation.
49
This definition is particularly interesting because it does not limit 
“hacking” to the exploitation of vulnerabilities in software, firmware, and 
hardware, and thus the definition also encompasses social engineering tech-
niques (e.g., phishing and water holing). Focusing on hacking’s broad ob-
jective, gaining access to data, should be the preferred approach.
In this sense, the main applications of lawful hacking can be divided in-
to two main categories: (i) deployment of hacking tools in the context of 
criminal investigations to remotely access stored or in transit data (e.g., re-
mote installation of malware for surveillance purposes); or (ii) deployment 
of hacking tools in the context of the forensic examination of a seized hard 
drive (e.g., breaking into an encrypted smartphone, such as in the San Ber-
nardino case).
50
Even though both modalities pose obvious threats to privacy and securi-
ty, the pervasiveness, scope, and risks associated with remote access to data 
stand out. This distinction should be considered by legislators when deter-
mining both the concept and scope of a legal framework for lawful hacking.
B. Establishing Prerequisites and Limitations
As is expected with any kind of investigative technique, lawful hacking 
regulation should be structured in compliance with fundamental rights and 
49. Stepanovich, supra note 42, at 5.
50. See generally Mayer, supra note 42.
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due process in mind. In light of data privacy and system security concerns, a 
set of ex ante considerations must be established in order to limit the use 
(and, subsequently, the harms) of this approach.
51
Firstly, this means that legislators must make it explicit that lawful 
hacking techniques should be employed ultima ratio, after less pervasive 
means of investigation are proven useless to the investigation (even other 
pervasive means, such as wiretapping). Additionally, in order to avoid abus-
es, it is imperative to include mechanisms like mandatory judicial authoriza-
tion for its deployment. A legal framework for lawful hacking should (i) 
limit the duration of the deployment (relevant to when it is used for moni-
toring purposes, on the ‘remote access to data’ category); and (ii) require 
that law enforcement narrows as much as possible the actors, devices and 
kinds of information obtained in order for judicial authorization to be grant-
ed. A separate challenge regarding judicial authorization is informing and 
educating judges about the technical aspects of lawful hacking and its pos-
sible consequences.
An additional approach could be to allow for the employment of lawful 
hacking only for the investigation of certain, more serious crimes. Necessity 
(pondering whether less invasive means of investigation could be used to 
achieve the same results) and proportionality (weighing the privacy interests 
of individuals against the government interest as determined by the severity, 
exigency, and/or perceived threat of the crime) should be considered case by 
case.
52
In addition to the San Bernardino attack, which was dealt with as a 
terrorism case, lawful hacking has also been successfully used in high pro-
file investigations on the darknet,
53
specifically regarding crimes of child 
sexual exploitation (Operation Torpedo
54
(2011) and Operation Pacifier
55





(2017) respectively). This restriction not only pre-
vents abuses but also helps optimize resource allocation, since lawful hack-
ing tools can be rather expensive. This will be further explored next.
51. See generally Stepanovich supra note 42
52. See generally Gutheil et al., supra note 48.
53. KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44827, LAW ENFORCEMENT USING 
AND DISCLOSING TECHNOLOGY VULNERABILITIES, 2-5 (2017).
54. Id. at 3.
55. Dan Alfin, “Playpen” Creator Sentenced to 30 Years, FBI NEWS (May 5, 2017), 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/playpen-creator-sentenced-to-30-years.
56. Andy Greenberg, Global Web Crackdown Arrests 17, Seizes Hundreds of Dark Net 
Domains, WIRED (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/operation-onymous-dark-
web-arrests.
57. Andy Greenberg, Global Police Spring a Trap on Thousands of Dark Web Users,
WIRED (July 20, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/alphabay-hansa-takedown-dark-web-
trap.
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C. Developing and Purchasing Hacking Tools
Depending on the kind and complexity of the system being accessed by 
law enforcement, hacking tools can be extremely expensive and hard to 
come by. This is the case of zero-day vulnerabilities—”a vulnerability dis-
covered and exploited prior to public awareness or disclosure to the ven-
dor.”
58
Since popular systems undergo rigorous and constant security 
checks, zero-days are extremely rare and, upon discovery, quickly patched 
in system updates. These conditions make hacking tools both expensive and 
only temporarily useful. The issue that this represents is twofold: Who is 
going to develop those tools, and who is going to pay for the research and 
development involved in their elaboration?
With regard to the first question, it is possible to assume three possible 
alternatives: Authorities can (i) use preexisting public vulnerabilities (such 
as those found in the National Vulnerability Database
59
), especially when 
the target is an outdated system; (ii) develop the technology in-house; or 
(iii) purchase it from a third party—as evidenced in the San Bernardino iPh-
one case.
60
Purchasing, however, has the potential to incentivize the growth 
and cultivation of a vulnerabilities market.
61
This could be problematic since 
these valuable hacking tools could end up in the hands of the highest bid-
ders (which could include anyone from criminals to oppressive govern-
ments). The possibility of law enforcement uses skewing the market, how-
ever, has been contested by experts.
62
In addition, Bellovin, Blaze, Clark, 
and Landau
63
argue that third party purchases of hacking tools could also 
increase incentives against the disclosure of system vulnerabilities.
As for governments developing their own hacking tools, the biggest 
challenges are costs and complexity. Unlike telephone wiretapping, which 
often involved a limited number of wiretapping techniques and actors (since 
58. Bellovin et al., supra note 44, at 23.
59. National Vulnerability Database, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., 
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
60. It has been reported (although not officially confirmed) that the FBI purchased the 
tool to hack into the locked iPhone for over one million dollars. Danny Yadron, FBI Admits it 
Paid $1.3m to Hack into San Bernardino iPhone, GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/21/fbi-apple-iphone-hack-san-bernardino-
price-paid.
61. See Riana Pfefferkorn, Security Risks of Government Hacking, REPORT - CTR.
INTERNET & SOC’Y 5 (2018).
62. “One danger of law enforcement’s participation in the zero-day market is the possi-
bility of skewing the market, either by increasing incentives against disclosure of the vulnera-
bility or by increasing the market for vulnerabilities and thus encouraging greater participation 
in it. Because of the current size of the market and the relatively minimal need by law en-
forcement, we do not believe that this will be an issue. It is hard to know exactly under which 
circumstances vulnerabilities will be used since the FBI has not discussed under what tech-
nical circumstances they have encountered difficulties wiretapping, but we do believe usage 
will be rare.” Bellovin et al., supra note 44, at 47.
63. Id.
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the tapping is often performed within the infrastructure of the telecom pro-
viders), some hacking tools involve meddling with a multiplicity of soft-
ware, hardware, and security systems. The fact that Lawful hacking solu-
tions tend to be tailor-made for the targeted system adds another layer of 
difficulty.
64
Moreover, the cost of development is continuous since hacking 
tools can be rendered useless after the exploited vulnerability is found and 
patched by the vendor.
This is a common problem in developing countries where investigative 
authorities are often technologically disadvantaged, and the budget for re-
search and development of investigative tools is not enough to keep up with 
the rapid pace of information security development.
D. Disclosing Vulnerabilities
Though scarce, current scholarly works on lawful hacking seem to 
agree that one of the most difficult regulatory challenges is the need to re-
port vulnerabilities—either to vendors, targeted individuals or the popula-
tion in general
65
Scholars seem to agree that the need for disclosure is essen-
tial, since existing vulnerabilities might be discovered and exploited by 
criminals. Nevertheless, only a few scholars have addressed in depth the 
double-edged sword that the disclosure represents if not properly safeguard-
ed.
66
On the one hand, it is possible to affirm that lack of proper vulnerability 
disclosure may generate serious consequences to users after its discovery 
and exploitation. A recent event that illustrates the possible consequences of 
government hacking without transparency framework is the WannaCry ran-
somware. In April 2017, a self-proclaimed hacking group called Shadow 
Brokers released a series of NSA documents that dealt with cyber weapons 
developed by the Agency.
67
Several documents dealt specifically with hack-
ing tools, describing vulnerabilities (including a set of zero-days) of popular 
applications that were exploited to carry out these activities. A widely used 
vulnerability, dubbed “EternalBlue,” was found in the Windows operating 
system. Although it was patched in later versions, the leaked vulnerability 
was used to disseminate the WannaCry ransomware, which proliferated in 
64. See Chen-Yu Li et al., A Comprehensive Overview of Government Hacking World-
wide, IEEE ACCESS, 55053, 55065 (2018).
65. See, e.g., Herpig, supra note 42, at 20; Li et al., supra note 64, at 55066; Ro-
zenshtein, supra note 42, at 1208; Stepanovich, supra note 42, at 22.
66. On models for evaluating requirements for disclosure, see Bellovin et al., supra 
note 44; Li et al., supra note 64; and Stephanie K. Pell & James Finocchiaro, The Ethical Im-
perative for a Vulnerability Equities Process and How the Common Vulnerability Scoring 
System Can Aid That Process, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1549 (2017).
67. Lily Hay Newman, The Leaked NSA Spy Tool that Hacked the World, WIRED (Mar. 
7, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/eternalblue-leaked-nsa-spy-tool-hacked-
world.
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dozens of countries and affected hospitals, companies, and courts.
68
The 
same vulnerability was used afterwards to produce another more powerful 
ransomware, NotPetya, which was even more destructive than its predeces-
sor.
69
On the other hand, disclosing vulnerabilities may render them useless to 
law enforcement if the vendor patches the exploit in newer versions of the 
targeted system.
70
Eventually, if the authorities need to target the system for 
a subsequent investigation, a new vulnerability must be found and exploited, 
incurring the costs and efforts mentioned in the previous subsections.
A legal framework for lawful hacking should address at least four im-
portant questions regarding vulnerability disclosure:
(i) Should the vulnerability be disclosed? The answer to this first and 
most complex question has to encompass multiple policy and technical con-
siderations. Policy considerations should contemplate all the aforemen-
tioned lawful hacking issues; technical considerations should assess the 
“significance of the vulnerability’s threat to information security”;71
(ii) When should it be disclosed? After deciding in favor of the disclo-
sure, a second step is establishing the moment for vulnerability disclosure. 
Should it happen right after its exploitation for the investigation? Should it 
occur right after the end of the investigation? Should other factors be taken 
into consideration?;
(iii) How should it be disclosed? Another challenge is developing a way 
to safely disclose the vulnerability, ensuring that no malicious parties can 
get ahold of it before the vendor is able to patch the system;
(iv) To whom should it be disclosed? It is important to define the parties 
that are going to be informed of the vulnerability. The vendor of the soft-
ware/firmware/hardware is the most obvious answer, but other parties could 
also be affected.
Informing users of the affected system is a particularly sensitive issue. 
This is important because, depending on what is revealed, criminals could 
be able to identify the inner workings of the vulnerability and target outdat-
ed systems. Efforts to make technology users aware of the importance of 
software updates for security reasons are mandatory; otherwise, both the 
68. Brian Barrett, The Encryption Debate Should End Right Now, WIRED. (Jun. 30, 
2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/encryption-backdoors-shadow-brokers-vault-
7-wannacry.
69. Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack 
in History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-
cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world.
70. See Paul Ohm, The Investigative Dynamics of the Use of Malware by Law En-
forcement, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 303, 314 (2017).
71. Pell & Finocchiaro, supra note 66, at 1565–77 (proposing a scoring system based 
on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (“CVSS”) in order to evaluate the pervasive-
ness of the vulnerability, its risks, and when to disclose it).
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rigorous process of vulnerability disclosure by the authorities and the patch-
ing by the vendor could be rendered useless in practice.
E. Jurisdictional Considerations
The last issue specifically relates to when lawful hacking is deployed to 
access data remotely: What if a targeted system or user is located outside of 
the jurisdiction where the hacking was authorized? The inherent transna-
tional structure of the Internet, along with the ever-growing popularity of 
cloud services (whose servers are spread around the world) require an en-
hancement of international treaties regarding law enforcement cooperation 
for local lawful hacking frameworks to be effective. To understand how 
these issues are being addressed in actual legal frameworks, the next section 
will analyze four countries that have recently enacted legislation regarding 
lawful hacking.
III. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC APPROACHES TO 
LAWFUL HACKING REGULATION
In response to the “going dark” debate, a number of countries have been 
both discussing and enacting legislation pertaining to lawful hacking either 
in addition to or instead of regulating the development, implementation, and 
use of encrypted systems. The present section provides an overview of ex-
isting lawful hacking-related legislation in Germany, France, and Australia
72
and the uncodified Vulnerabilities Equity Process (“VEP”) in the United 
States. The objective of this section is to understand if the previously listed 
issues are being addressed in these countries.
Before that, it is important to clarify that this Note does not perform an 
in-depth analysis of those laws or their application in real cases. There are 
two main reasons for this. First, most of the legislation was enacted fairly 
recently; thus, the full extent of its reach has yet to be understood. Second, 
even if those laws are being enforced on a daily basis, cases that require the 
employment of lawful hacking techniques tend to be kept secret, at least un-
til the conclusion of the investigation, rendering the casefiles inaccessible.
A. Germany
The “going dark” debate in Germany took a very particular approach 
compared with other countries. Although it was initially reported
73
that 
72. The main sources of information for this section, beyond the legislation itself, are 
the following works: Gutheil et al., supra note 48; Cryptomap, supra note 26; Government 
Access to Encrypted Communications, LAW LIBRARY CONG. (2016).
73. Natasha Lomas, Encryption Under Fire in Europe as France and Germany Call for 
Decrypt Law, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 24, 2016, 7:40 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/24/
encryption-under-fire-in-europe-as-france-and-germany-call-for-decrypt-law; France, Ger-
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Germany was pushing for a restriction of encrypted systems, it opted to re-
frain from regulating cryptography along the lines of the aforementioned 
regulatory approaches. Germany instead focused on establishing a more ro-
bust legal framework for lawful hacking activities.
Over the past ten years, a more concrete approach to lawful hacking ac-
tivities has been delineated both through legal norms and case law. This 
culminated in a reform of the German Code of Criminal Procedure 
(Strafprozessordnung, or “StPO”) in August 2017 that addressed those de-
velopments.
With regard to case law predating the StPO reform, a 2008 decision of 
the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
“BVerfG”) is considered a landmark case. It was the first ruling on a law
74
that granted law enforcement authority to “secret[ly] access information 
technology systems.”
75
In the ruling, the court defined that this “secret ac-
cess” meant “technical infiltration that takes advantage of vulnerabilities of 
the targeted system, or that is carried out by the installation of a spy pro-
gram.”
76
The decision stated that this kind of “secret access” is inherently 
unconstitutional except in cases where either the exploitation is merely used 
to access the content of communications in accordance with preexisting 
lawful intercept legislation or if there is a “concrete danger to a predomi-
nantly important legal interest.”
77
Beyond those judicial developments, there are two main laws that regu-
late government hacking activities: the Federal Criminal Police Office Act 
of 1997
78
(Bundeskriminalamtgesetz, “BKAG”), an administrative Law that 
regulates the activity of law enforcement authorities, and the aforemen-




of the BKAG explicitly establishes that the Federal 
Crime Police Office may collect data in the course of investigations through 
intervention in computer systems. However, the norm restricts the use of the 
technique to investigations that involve danger to life, limitations to free-
dom, and national security. The BKAG also restricts the deployment of the 
many Want Messaging Apps to Limit Encryption to Fight Terrorism, GLOBAL NEWS (Aug. 
23, 2016, 9:15 AM), https://globalnews.ca/news/2897557/france-germany-want-messaging-
apps-limit-encryption-to-fight-terrorism.
74. More specifically, the Verfassungsschutzgesetz Nordrhein-Westfalen [VSG NRW] 
[“North-Rhine Westphalia Constitution Protection Act”], Dec. 20, 1994 (Ger.)
75. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 27, 2008, 
1 BvR 370/07 (Ger.).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Bundeskriminalamtgesetz [BKAG] [Federal Criminal Police Office Act], July 7, 
1997, BGBL I at 1650, repealed May 25, 2018, BGBL I at 1354 (Ger.).
79. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], July 4, 1987, 
BGBL. I at 1074, as amended Mar. 3, 2020, BGBL. I at 431 (Ger.).
80. BKAG § 20k.
338 Michigan Technology Law Review [Vol. 26:317
technique to targets that are either suspects in the case being investigated or 
are communicating with suspects. There is also a maximum limit of three 
months for data intercept in this modality.
The StPO, by contrast, is more detailed and encompassing. In regulat-
ing lawful interception, hacking is allowed as an “annex competence,”
meaning that it is permitted to facilitate the interception (such as allowing
access to encrypted communication before it is encrypted). In addition, 
German law enforcement may also use any means necessary to access en-
crypted data on seized devices—which naturally includes hacking the de-
vice.
81
On August 17, 2017, the Act to Make Criminal Proceedings More 
Effective and Practicable
82
(Gesetz zur effektiveren und praxistauglicheren 
Ausgestaltung des Strafverfahrens) was enacted and amended the StPO in 
order to expand the powers of the German authorities to conduct online 
searches
83
and source telecommunications surveillance.
84
The StPO also includes a number of ex ante and ex post measures for 
the interception of communication must be met. In regard to ex ante consid-
erations,
85
authorization of a court is required. The StPO allows the govern-
ment to bypass court authorization in urgent cases, but authorization must 
be confirmed by a court within three days. For approval, an interception 
must meet the following requirements: (i) there is reasonable suspicion of 
the investigated individual; (ii) the accessed data will not reach the core of 
the individual’s private life; and (iii) the interception request must specify 
the data being accessed.
In regard to ex post considerations, the authorities are required to in-
form the target of the hacking as early as possible without prejudice to the 
investigation itself.
86
In addition, law enforcement authorities must issue an-
nual transparency reports to the Federal Office of Justice containing: (i) the 
number of procedures in which government hacking was deployed for ac-
cess to data; (ii) the number of judicial orders; (iii) the means used in the 
investigation; (iv) the description of the targeted systems and the changes 
81. Gutheil et al., supra note 48, at 79.
82. Gesetz zur Effektiveren und Praxistauglicheren Ausgestaltung des Strafver-
fahrens [Act to Make Criminal Proceedings More Effective and Practicable], Aug. 23, 2017, 
BGBL. I at 3206 (Ger.).
83. An online search consists of “obtaining technical access to an information technol-
ogy system from a suspect without his or her knowledge for the purpose of extracting data.”
StPO §100b. Before it was purely a case law construction, but the reform created section 100b 
of StPO, which outlines the requirements for online searches that are not related to lawful in-
terception. Id.
84. The source telecommunications surveillance allows the investigating authority to 
obtain access to source data prior to encryption in the context of a telecommunications inter-
ception request. Id. § 100a.
85. Id. § 100a-g.
86. Id. § 101(5).
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done to it; (v) the criminal type that led to the procedure; (vi) and infor-
mation on the data collected.
87
Paragraph 100a of the StPO establishes that lawful access to data is on-
ly allowed in certain cases of serious crimes, with paragraph 100a(2) 
providing an exhaustive list of those crimes. However, the list has been crit-
icized for being overbroad and general; there are twenty-five subsections in 
§100a(2), and crimes vary from specific (murder and manslaughter) to sub-
jective (crimes against public order).
B. France
France’s regulatory responses to the “going dark” debate involved both 
encryption and government hacking activities. In 2016, the French Code of 
Criminal Procedure (Code de Procédure Pénale,88 “CPP”) was amended by 
the LOI nº 2016-731 of 2016,
89
aiming to “reinforce the fight against orga-
nized crime, terrorism, and its financing” (“renforçant la lutte contre le 
crime organisé, le terrorisme et leur financement, et améliorant l’efficacité 
et les garanties de la procédure pénale”). The text was altered to include 
devices that strengthened investigatory powers concerning access to en-
crypted systems and deployment of hacking techniques.
90
Before the amendment, the French Criminal Code (Code pénal) already 
criminalized the refusal to deliver the means for decryption of an encrypted 
content when required by authorities.
91
The amendment hardened the pun-
ishment for that crime.
92
In regard to lawful hacking, the amendment altered and included devic-
es on Chapter II of Title XXV in the CPP that deal with the two main func-
tionalities of the technique. Section 5
93
was altered in order to encompass, 
alongside traditional lawful means of interception (such as wiretapping), the 
use of digital tools for its conduction. Section 6bis
94
was included in order to 
regulate investigatory powers related to access to computer data in the fol-
lowing modalities: (i) remote access initiated by the physical installation of 
87. Id. § 101b.
88. CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PÉN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] (Fr.).
89. Loi 2016-731 du 3 Juin 2016 renforçant la lutte contre le crime organisé, le terror-
isme et leur financement, et améliorant l’efficacité et les garanties de la procédure pénale (1) 
[Law 2016-731 of June 3, 2016 Strengthening the Fight Against Organized Crime, Terrorism
and Their Financing, and Improving the Efficiency and the Guarantees of the Criminal Proce-
dure (1)], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], June 3, 2016 (Fr.).
90. Gutheil et al., supra note 48, 73-76.
91. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.][PENAL CODE] art. 434-15-2 (Fr.).
92. See Acharya et al, supra note 4, at 4.
93. Code de Procédure Pénale [C. Pr. Pén.][Criminal Procedure Code] art. 706-95 to 
706-95-10 (Fr.).
94. Id. art. 706-102-1 to 706-102-9.
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spyware on targeted computer of the investigation; and (ii) access to com-
puterized data carried out entirely remotely.
The CPP also established a set of ex ante and ex post requirements that 
must be considered in relation to lawful hacking. Ex ante considerations in-
clude: an exhaustive (albeit broad) list of crimes
95
that establish when this 
means of investigation is allowed, particular procedures for obtaining war-
rants, and a time limit for the conduction of the investigation.
96 Ex post con-
siderations are centered on inspection and supervision of those activities by 
authorities.
97
Surprisingly, even though the framework is reasonably thorough, there 
seems to be no legal device concerning transparency and accountability of 
lawful hacking activities, vulnerabilities, or impacted individuals.
98
C. Australia
Government hacking regulation in Australia, unlike the other countries 
discussed above, does not have a specific law pertaining to it. Instead, the 
regulation is spread across multiple Acts enacted throughout different dec-
ades. Similar to France, however, the Australian government enacted legis-
lation that aims to both enhance law enforcement’s hacking powers and 
regulate the use of encrypted systems.
The basis for lawful hacking regulation in Australia can be found in two 
laws from the 1970s: The Telecommunication (Interception and Access) 
Act of 1979 (“TIA Act”) for law enforcement purposes, and the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organization Act of 1979 (“ASIO Act”) for intelli-
gence purposes. The TIA Act is the main law on government intercept of 
communications of Australian citizens. It is used to authorize interception 
because its language is broad enough to encompass modalities beyond tele-
phone wiretapping.
99
The ASIO Act establishes the procedure for Intelli-
gence Authorities to obtain the required warrants for the investigation. 
Gutheil et al
100
note that Section 25A
101
of this Act can be understood as the 
first Australian law that deals with legal hacking, in this case specifically by 
the Australian Secret Service. This is because, despite not mentioning 
“hacking” specifically, it determines the possibility of authorities targeting 
“computers . . . systems of computer . . . computer networks; or any combi-
nation of the above,” which opens up a range of systems for the Australian 
authorities to target.
95. Id. art. 706-73, 706-73-1.
96. Id. art. 706-102-3.
97. Gutheil et al., supra note 48, at 74-75.
98. Id. at 75-76.
99. See Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (Austl.).
100. Gutheil et al, supra note 48, at 114.
101. Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) s 25A (Austl.).
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A piece of legislation that deals more directly with the techniques em-
ployed in hacking activities can be found in the Surveillance Devices Act of 
2004 (“SD Act”).
102
Among other things, it regulates the ability of law en-
forcement authorities to install and use surveillance devices. Surveillance 
devices are defined in Section 6 as “any device or program capable of being 
used to record or monitor the input of information into, or the output of in-
formation from, a computer.” This encompasses any electronic device capa-
ble of storing or processing information, including cell phones, tablets, lap-
tops, routers, etc.
In order to perform this kind of investigation, a judicial warrant is man-
datory along with other requirements. There must be reasonable grounds to 
suspect that a particular individual uses the exploited service; the infor-
mation obtained should assist in the investigation of one or more serious of-
fenses in which the investigated person is involved; and all other investiga-
tive means must be exhausted so that the warrant for access to 
telecommunications can be given.
103
The recently enacted Telecommunications and Other Legislation 
Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act of 2018
104
amended all previously 
mentioned laws, addressing both the encryption debate and expanding in-
vestigatory powers in regard to access to computer data (both communica-
tions and stored information). In late 2018, the law (then still a bill) came 
under fire for being overwhelmingly vague, possibly allowing for interpreta-
tion that could lead to the weakening of encrypted systems.
105
Lastly, the transparency and accountability of Australian government 
hacking power and activities is likely to be problematic, since Article 37 of 
the Freedom of Information Act of 1982
106
gives law enforcement authori-
ties the right to refrain from doing so.
107
This has been the target of criti-
102. Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) (Austl.).
103. Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) s 46 (Austl.).
104. Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) 
Act 2018 (Cth) (Austl.).
105. See, e.g., Ariel Bogle, “Outlandish” Encryption Laws Leave Australian Tech In-
dustry Angry and Confused, ABC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2018) https://www.abc.net.au/news/science/
2018-12-07/encryption-bill-australian-technology-industry-fuming-mad/10589962; Lily Hay 
Newman, Australia’s Encryption-Busting Law Could Impact Global Privacy. WIRED (Dec. 8, 
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/australia-encryption-law-global-impact; Jamie Tarabay, 
Australian Government Passes Contentious Encryption Law. N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/world/australia/encryption-bill-nauru.html.
106. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (Austl.).
107. “(1) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would, or 
could reasonably be expected to . . . (b) disclose, or enable a person to ascertain, the existence 
or identity of a confidential source of information in relation to the enforcement or administra-
tion of the law; (2) . . . (b) disclose lawful methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, 
investigating, or dealing with matters arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law the dis-
closure of which would, or would be reasonably likely to, prejudice the effectiveness of those 
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cism,
108
especially because the Australian legal order does not have a robust 
fundamental/human rights protection law.
D. United States
Despite the relatively long history of lawful hacking in the US,
109
the 
country does not have a specific legal framework for its deployment. There 
are, however, two regulatory mechanisms of note: (i) Rule 41(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (“FRCP”) and (ii) the Vulnerabilities 
Equities Process.
In 2016, the FRCP was amended in order to extend the powers related 
to searches of computer devices. Rule 41(b)(6)
110
basically grants judges the 
power to authorize remote access to computers by federal law enforcement 
agencies. The amendment expanded “the reach of the [FRCP] under two 
circumstances: when a suspect has hidden a device using technological 
means, and when the [law enforcement agencies] can identify devices locat-
ed in multiple jurisdictions. These amendments make it possible for [law 
enforcement agencies] to obtain judicial warrants to search for computers 
located in unknown or multiple locations.”
111
Those alterations came under fire because of the lack of safeguard 
mechanisms, the potential for bulk hackings and jurisdictional problems.
112
Even more interesting is the Vulnerabilities Equities Process (“VEP”). 
VEP is an administrative deliberation process conducted by U.S. govern-
ment authorities to determine whether to disclose or keep zero-day vulnera-
bilities that are used for law enforcement and intelligence purposes, along 
with its subsequent process for disclosure.
113
Most of the decision-making 
process is conducted by the Equities Review Board, an intra-agency delib-
eration forum.
114
methods or procedures; or (c) prejudice the maintenance or enforcement of lawful methods for 
the protection of public safety.” Id. para 37.
108. See Gutheil et al, supra note 48, 113-14.
109. See generally QUINLAN & WILSON, supra note 3.
110. “[A] magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities related to a 
crime may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant to use remote access to search elec-
tronic storage media and to seize or copy electronically stored information located within or 
outside that district if: (A) the district where the media or information is located has been con-
cealed through technological means; or (B) in an investigation of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a)(5), the media are protected computers that have been damaged without authorization 
and are located in five or more districts.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
111. Li et al., supra note 64, at 55061.
112. See Steven M. Bellovin, Susan Landau & Matt Blaze, Insecure Surveillance: Tech-
nical Issues with Remote Computer Searches, 49 IEEE COMPUTER 14, 14 (2016).
113. Pell & Finocchiaro, supra note 66, at 1554
114. Composed of the following U.S. government agencies: the Office of Management 
and Budget; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the Department of the Treas-
ury; the Department of State; the Department of Justice (including the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (“NCIJTF”)); the Depart-
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Due to its classified nature, information about the VEP has always been 
scarce. It has been reported that the process has been discussed in some 
form since at least the late 2000s, but its existence was only confirmed in 
2014.
115
After the EternalBlue and WannaCry/NotPetya situations in 2017, the 
U.S. government published a more in-depth document on the inner work-
ings of the VEP.
116
The document details the structure and workflow of the 
Equities Review Board and the VEP Executive Secretariat, the decision-
making procedure, and the process for the dissemination of the vulnerabil-
ity. Moreover, the document also puts forth what is taken into consideration 
by the Board when evaluating the need for vulnerability disclosure, divided 
into four main categories: (i) impact on the system and its users; (ii) opera-
tional impact and value for law enforcement and intelligence; (iii) commer-
cial impact; and (iv) risks for U.S. international relations.
117
While the idea and structure of the VEP are commendable, the lack of a 
legal framework that pushes toward transparency and accountability makes 
it hard to evaluate the actual effectiveness of what is deliberated by the 
Board.
ment of Homeland Security (including the National Cybersecurity Communications and Inte-
gration Center (“NCCIC”) and the United States Secret Service (“USSS”)); the Department of 
Energy; the Department of Defense (including the National Security Agency (“NSA”) (in-
cluding Information Assurance and Signals Intelligence elements), the United States Cyber 
Command, and the Department of Defense (“DoD”) Cyber Crime Center (“DC3”)); the De-
partment of Commerce; and the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”). Vulnerabilities Equities 
Policy and Process for the United States Government at 3 (Nov. 15, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/External%20-%20
Unclassified%20VEP%20Charter%20FINAL.PDF.
115. This happened because of a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) lawsuit made by 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) against NSA, regarding the Agency’s use of a 
vulnerability called “Heartbleed.” “Complaint for Injunctive Relief for Violation of the Free-
dom of Info. Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 at 4-5, Elec. Frontier Found. v. NSA, No. 14-cv-03010, 2016 
WL 1059389 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2016). Michael Daniel, Special Assistant to the President 
and Cybersecurity Coordinator of the Obama Administration, addressed the VEP in a blog 
post. Michael Daniel, Heartbleed: Understanding When We Disclose Cyber Vulnerabilities,
WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Apr. 28, 2014, 3:00 PM), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/04/28/heartbleed-understanding-when-we-
disclose-cyber-vulnerabilities.
116. See Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United States Government,
supra note 114.
117. Id. at 13-14.
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CONCLUSION: TAKING LAWFUL HACKING TO THE 
CENTER STAGE OF THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE
The debate on government access to encrypted data is far from over.
118
Law enforcement agencies around the world continue to push for regulation 
that restricts the use of encryption, while industry and technical experts keep 
pointing out security and privacy issues that could ensue from this kind of 
regulation. In this regard, alternative means of investigation such as metada-
ta, non-encrypted data stored in the cloud and lawful hacking are often sug-
gested. Over the past few years, some countries have been proposing or en-
acting laws to address this issue, adopting different regulatory approaches. 
Some of those approaches focus solely on the limitation of encryption tech-
nologies while others encompass proposed alternatives, specifically lawful 
hacking.
The problem is that, although lawful hacking is definitely a more desir-
able alternative to the restriction of encryption, the debate on how lawful 
hacking should be regulated is still in its early stages. Nevertheless, coun-
tries not only already deploy hacking tools for criminal investigations, but 
also maintain laws aimed towards these tools that are failing to address the 
multitude of issues posed by lawful hacking.
A robust legal framework for lawful hacking is needed in order to ena-
ble law enforcement investigatory activities on the one hand, and safeguard 
security, fundamental rights, and due process on the other. The hurdles to 
establishing this framework are what should take center stage in the “going 
dark” debate. Five of its most complex challenges were highlighted in this 
Note:
• Defining “lawful hacking” for legal purposes: What kind of 
activities does “lawful hacking” encompass? Also, a distinction 
between hacking devices on site and accessing devices remote-
ly should be outlined, due to the more intrusive nature of the 
latter.
• Establishing prerequisites for deployment: Lawful hacking 
regulation must be based on its ultima ratio character due to its 
pervasiveness. Along with that, its deployment should require 
118. In October 2019, U.S. Attorney General William Barr, along with officials from 
Australia and the United Kingdom released an open letter to Facebook, addressing the compa-
ny’s intent to expand encryption by default in its unencrypted messaging services Instagram 
Direct and Facebook Messenger. The officials urged the company to “enable law enforcement 
to obtain lawful access to content in a readable and usable format,” reinforcing all that was put 
forth over the last half decade of the “going dark” debate. Letter from Rt. Hon. Priti Patel MP, 
U.K. Sec’y State Home Dep’t, et al., to Mark Zuckerberg, Chief Exec. Officer, Facebook 
(Oct. 4, 2019), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6450624/US-UK-Australia-letter-
to-Zuckerberg-10-4-19.pdf.
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judicial authorization and be limited to certain crimes based on 
their gravity.
• Developing and purchasing hacking tools: Special attention 
should be given to the acquisition of hacking tools from third 
parties so as to avoid legitimizing the growth and cultivation of 
a “vulnerabilities market” where those tools could end up in 
malicious hands.
• Disclosing vulnerabilities: Perhaps the biggest challenge of 
them all is establishing if and how to disclose vulnerabilities 
used by law enforcement. The need for accountability and 
transparency in regard to hacking activities seems to be a point 
of agreement among scholars, but little is discussed in regard to 
its operationalization.
• Jurisdictional issues: Specifically in regard to the remote ac-
cess modality, the last challenge is how to address the effect of 
local lawful hacking activities beyond borders. This is compli-
cated by the inherent transnational nature of the Internet.
Despite these challenges, lawful hacking still stands as a preferable sub-
stitute to mandating exceptional access to encrypted systems. It should take 
center stage in the “going dark” debate, with efforts focusing on how to best 
develop a legal framework that enables law enforcement activities and re-
spects fundamental rights.
It is a viable approach that must be carefully discussed, analyzed, and 
regulated in order to avoid a future that is singularly bright for law enforce-
ment and entirely dark for user privacy and security.

